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THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN 
AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: 
SUGGESTIONS FOR MORE 
EFFECTIVENESS 
U. O. UMOZURIKE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Organization of African Unity (hereinafter "OAU"), renamed the 
African Union (hereinafter "AU"), is a continental institution that pro-
motes political, economic and cultural cooperation and integration 
among African states.' The Organization created the African Commis-
sion on Human and Peoples' Rights, which entered into force under the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights of 1981.2 The Commis-
sion's functions are enumerated in Article 45 of the Charter; the relevant 
provisions are to promote human rights, protect human rights as laid 
* U. Oji Umozurike is a Professor of Law at the Abia State University, Uturu, Nigeria. 
Professor Umozurike is recognised for his extensive writing on human rights in Africa. From 1995 
until 2003, he served as a member of Nigeria's Human Rights Commission. He was also a member 
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights from 1989 to 1997 and served as chair-
person from 1989 to 1991. He has taught at several institutions including the University of Pretoria 
in South Africa and the University of Lund in Sweden. Professor Umozurike was Research Profes-
sor at the Max-Planck Institute for Law from 1986 to 1987 and is a Barrister-at-Law in Lincon's Inn, 
London and of the Supreme Court of Nigeria. Professor Umozurike obtained his D.Phil from Ox-
ford University and his LL M and LL B from the University of London. 
I. Constitutive Act of the African Union, OAU Doc. CABILEGI23.15 (May 26, 2001) (trans-
forming the Organization of African Unity into the African Union). 
2. African Charter on Human and People's Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, entered into 
force Oct. 21, 1986 (hereinafter "African Charter"). The African Charter has been ratified by ail 
fifty-three member states of the Organization of African Unity! African Union. Cristof Heyns, The 
African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 679, 683 
(2004); U.O.UMOZURIKE, THE AFRICAN CHARTER (Martinus Nijhoff Pub. 1997); U.O.Umozurike, 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 902, 908 (1983). 
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down in the Charter, interpret the provisions of the Charter, and carry out 
other functions assigned to it by the Assembly of Heads of State.3 In 
carrying out its functions, the Commission shall not only cooperate with 
other human rights organization, but have regard for the international law 
of human rights and other treaties, especially those of which African 
states are parties.4 
The Secretary-General of the AU is the main link between the Commis-
sion and the parent organization, supplying its administrative staff work-
ing directly under his supervision.s The Assembly of Heads of State 
receives the Commission's annual reports,6 more specifically called its 
Activity Reports, and approves its budget.7 It elects the eleven members 
of the Commission who must be independent and versed in matters of 
human and peoples' rights.s The Commission may draw the Assembly's 
attention to special cases of serious or massive violations of human 
rights, while the Assembly may ask for an in-depth study and a factual 
report.9 Besides the annual reports, emergency situations are brought to 
the attention of the Chairman of the Assembly. 10 
One of the peculiarities of the Charter is the inclusion of peoples' rights, 
not only in the list of rights protected, but in the name of the Charter. l1 
The African system recognizes not only individual rights, but also at-
taches importance to the rights of the group as such. Individual rights are 
framed as protection for individuals against others, especially the gov-
ernment. Group rights emphasize that recognizable groups have rights 
and that the individual finds the fulfillment of his rights in that of the 
group. Such rights include the right to self-determination and the right to 
deve1opment. 12 
An avalanche of criticism greeted the Commission from its inception. 
Some of the criticisms were merited, but others were not, and only re-
3. African Charter, supra note 2, 21 I.L.M. 58, at art. 45. 
4. Id. at arts. 60,61. 
5. Id.atart.41. 
6. Id. at art. 54. 
7. Id. at arts. 41,44. 
8. Id. art. 31. 
9. Id. art. 58. 
10. Id. art. 58(c). 
11. See id. arts. 19-24. 
12. See N. B. Pityana, The Challenge of Culture for Human Rights In Africa, in THE AFRICAN 
CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEoPLES' RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, 1986- 2000, esp. 231-234 
(Malcom D. Evans & Rachael Murray, eds. 2002); Rachel Murray, Women's Rights and the Or-
ganization of African Unity and African Union: The Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST ApPROACHES, 253 - 272 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji, 
eds.2005); see also U.O.UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972). 
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vealed the lack of appreciation of the difficulties in interpreting the Char-
ter; these are discussed below under the section on the difficulties of the 
Commission. One critic regarded the Commission as "a fa~ade, a yoke 
that African leaders have put around our necks" which deserves to be 
cast awayY Earlier, some doubted that the Charter, even with the weak 
provisions for the enforcement of human rights, would be ratified at all. 14 
The achievements of the European Human Rights Commission and to a 
lesser extent, those of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
were well known to the international human rights community. The Af-
rican Commission was expected to follow the trail of the earlier Com-
missions without critics adequately considering its peculiarities and 
unique difficulties. 
This paper examines some of the problems of the African Commission, 
and its shortcomings, all of which gave room for the criticism and, more 
importantly, suggestions for the greater effectiveness of the Commission. 
The moderate achievements of the Commission are complicated by what 
appears to be some doubt about its desirability. The European Commis-
sion has been abolished and its functions merged with those of the Euro-
pean Courtl5 after it had functioned only long enough to develop human 
rights standards in Europe. The African Commission has existed for 
twenty years with inadequate resources and personnel. It is not even 
mentioned in the Constitutional Act of the AU as one of its organs, dis-
playing some doubt about its retention. The Constitutive Act of the Afri-
can Union 1961 provides for the Court of Justice of the African Union,16 
but this is entirely different from the African Court on Human and Peo-
ples' Rights, which was created under a separate treaty. We shall show 
that the there is a role for the African Commission and that the focus of 
development in that area for the next decade should be strengthening the 
Commission in keeping with the advice thoughtfully given by the Sene-
galese President to "keep constantly in mind our value of civilization and 
the real needs of Africa."17 
13. Makau wa Mutua,The African Human Rights System in a Comparative Perspective: The 
Need for Urgent Reformation,S LEGAL FORUM 31-35 (1993); see also Richard Gottleman, The 
Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights:A Legal Analysis, 22 VA. J. lNT'L L. 667, 692 
(1982); Peter Takirimbudde, Six Years of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: An 
Assessment, 712 LESOTHO L. 1. 41, 50-52 (1991); HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 
(Claude E. Weich, Jr. & Ronald I. Meltzer, eds. 1984). 
14. Olusola Ojo & Amadu Sesay, The OAU and Human Rights: Prospects for the 1980s and 
Beyond, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 89,101 (1986). 
IS. Protocol No. II to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 1,1988, Eur. T.S. No. 155. 
16. Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note I, at art. 5(1)(d). 
17. Address of President Leopold Senghor of Senegal to the Dakar Meeting of Experts Prepar-
ing the Draft Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc. CABILEG/67 IX. 
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II. SOME DIFFICULTIES THAT CONFRONTED THE AFRICAN 
COMMISSION 
The Charter provides that the Commission shall report a serious violation 
of human rights to the Assembly, or to the Chairman when the Assembly 
is not in session, and either may request an in-depth study of the situation 
without more. 18 The specific application of this provision, proved prob-
lematic, especially in light of Article 59, which directs that measures 
taken within the provisions of the Charter shall be kept confidential. I9 
This requirement, if observed strictly, effectively removes one of the 
weapons for enforcement of human rights - pUblicity. While debating its 
reaction to serious violations of human rights, and hamstrung by the re-
quirement of confidentiality, the Commission appeared, in the eyes of the 
public, to remain inactive, not even expressing condemnation at alleged 
acts of human rights violations. Developing procedures for such situa-
tions took time to materialize. One of the principles of the OAU was 
non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states.2o Although this 
clause really adds nothing new to the Charter of the Organization, it was 
a principle of international customary law, applicable in all circum-
stances. Unfortunately, members exaggerated its importance in order to 
ward off legitimate international concern from violations of human rights 
in their territories. That was especially the case with the military regimes 
that proliferated on the continent in the 60s and 70s, including the re-
gimes of Idi Amin of Uganda. Bokassa of Central Mrican Republic and 
Nguema of Equatorial Guinea. In drafting the Charter, states did not 
want to give the Commission wide latitude in human rights protection as 
evidenced from the restricted powers spelled out. The Commission was 
empowered to investigate complaints and make recommendations for 
amicable settlement and report its activities to the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government.21 There were gaps in the Charter that could only 
be filled by a purposive interpretation, and such interpretation took time 
to develop. Many Commissioners were more concerned with a literal 
interpretation of the enabling document than with the flexibility required 
by Articles 60 and 61 of the Charter. 22 
18. African Charter, supra note 2, arts. 58, 59. 
19. [d. at art. 59(1). 
20. OAU Charter, art. 3, May 25, 1963. 
21. African Charter, supra note 2, at ch. 3. 
22. African Charter, supra note 2, art. 60 ("The Commission shall draw inspiration from inter-
national law on Human and Peoples' Rights, particularly from the provisions of various African 
instruments on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the 
Organization of African Unity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other instruments 
adopted by the United Nations and by African countries in the field of Human and Peoples' Rights 
as well as from the provisions of various instruments adopted within the Specialized Agencies of the 
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Although the Charter addresses communications from States,23 there is 
no clear reference to those communications from non-governmental or-
ganizations and individuals. These were merely implied under "Other 
communications," i.e., communications from non-state parties.24 With 
one or two exceptions, the complaints that came before the Commission 
fall under this category. A complaint was filed by Libya against the 
U.S.A. for stationing troops in Zaire and Chad.2.5 Despite the clarifica-
tion that U.S.A. was not a party to the Charter, the Libyan ambassador in 
Lagos insisted upon filing the complaint. It was dismissed as inadmissi-
ble.26 The second complaint filed by a state came much later, and was by 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter "D.R.C.") against 
Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, whose troops invaded and committed 
gross violations of human rights in the Eastern provinces of D.R.C.27 It 
follows that the main preoccupation of the Commission has been on the 
implied application of the Charter. Some Commissioners were prepared 
to argue that complaints should not be received from entities other than 
states. The better reasoning later prevailed, but it took some time while 
interested parties directed justified criticism toward the Commission. 
The cases that were first concluded were those that were made by indi-
viduals against non-party states or those that disclosed no real violation 
of human rights.28 
United Nations of which the parties to the present Charter are members."). See also [d. at art. 61 
("The Commission shall also take into consideration, as subsidiary means to determine the principles 
of law, other general or special international conventions, laying down rules expressly recognized by 
member states of the Organization of African Unity, African practices consistent with international 
norms on Human and Peoples' Rights, customs generally accepted as law, general principles of law 
recognized by African states as well as legal precedents and doctrine."). 
23. [d. at arts. 47-54. 
24. [d. at arts. 55-59. 
25. Though the complaint was not recorded, the author, as presiding Chairman at the time, has 
knowledge of the events. 
26. Though the complaint was not recorded, the author, as presiding Chairman at the time, has 
knowledge of the event. 
27. Oem. Rep. Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda & Uganda, African Comm'n on H. & Peoples' R., 
Commc'n 227/99 adopted at the 33n1 Sess., 20m Activity Rep. (not yet reported in Dec. of the Afri-
can Comm. on H. & Peoples' R.). 
28. See Korvah v. Liber., African Comm'n on H. & Peoples' R., Commc'n 1188 (1988) (alleg-
ing corruption and immorality); Iheanyichukwu Ihebereme v. U.S., African Comm'n on H. & Peo-
ples' R., Commc'n 2188 (alleging unlawful imprisonment and police brutality); Ctr. for Independ-
ence of 1. and Lawyers v. Yugo, African Comm'n on H. & Peoples' R., Commc'n 3\88 (alleging 
deprivation of right to practice profession); Coordinating Sec'y of Free Citizens Convention v. 
Ghana, African Comm'n on H. & Peoples' R. Commc'n 4/88 (regarding wrongful arrest and deten-
tion; Ghana was then not a party to the Charter); Makoge v. U.S., African Comm'n on H. & Peoples' 
R. Commc'n 5/88 (alleging wrongful activities of the U.S.A. in Africa); Kodjo Kofi v. Ghana, 
African Comm'n on H. & Peoples' R. Commc'n 6/88 (regarding arrest and detention without trial); 
Comm. for the Def. of Political Prisoners v. Bahr., African Comm'n on H. & Peoples' R. Commc'n 
7/88 (regarding false imprisonment and torture); Int'l Lawyers Comm. on Family Reunification v. 
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These and other cases were not reported to the Assembly of Heads of 
State and IGovernment, and there were no official inquiries. Meanwhile, 
the human rights community anxiously awaited information on the work 
of the Commission, and presumed that it was doing nothing. The news 
from a number of African states disclosed serious violations of human 
rights, none of which elicited public reaction from the Commission. One 
interpretation of Article 59 of the Charter was that a report of the Com-
mission could not be published until the Assembly approved its publica-
tion. 
The case of Henri Kalenga V. Zambia29 not only showed the controversy 
within the Commission but also determined its policy on the content of 
its activity report regarding protective activities. Decisions were nor-
mally taken by consensus although Rule 62 of the Rules of Procedure 
required a simple majority.30 The facts of the case are as follows: The 
Zambian Government had detained the complainant for reasons that were 
not disclosed other than the blanket excuse of state security.3) A com-
plaint was sent to the African Commission and duly admitted.32 The 
commissioner elected from Zambia interceded and achieved an amicable 
settlement, after which Kalenga was releasedY The issue that arose was 
whether the activity report should include an account of the detention 
and the release.34 Some Commissioners argued that a state that complied 
with the request of the Commission should not be included in the report 
to the Assembly, as that would amount to a breach of good faith.35 It was 
argued that such a state would be embarrassed and feel inhibited to com-
ply in the future, especially since the report might also be published.36 
Other Commissioners felt that the true intent was to report the activities 
of the Commission, including those on human rights protection, to the 
Assembly. A state would be happy that the Assembly, and the public in 
general, know about its compliance with the African Charter rather than 
be embarrassed by the publication. If the procedure was not clearly 
Eth., African Comm'n on H. & Peoples' R. Commc'n 6/88 (regarding false imprisonment and tor-
ture); Abebe v. Eth., African Comm'n on H. & Peoples' R. Commc'n 10/88 (alleging false impris-
onment and deprivation of property). The final decisions are available at 
http://wwwl.urnn.edulhumanrts/africa/comcases/allcases.html. However, the factual details of the 
cases are unreported. 
29. Henri Kalenga v. Zambia African Comm'n on H. & Peoples' R. Commc'n 11/88, in 
COMPILATION OF DECISIONS OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS 366 
(African Inst. for H.R. &Dev., Banjul). 
30. R. P. OF THE AFRICAN COMM'N ON H. & PEOPLES' R. 62 (Oct 6, 1995). 
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stated, then Articles 60 and 61 point to best practices followed, as in the 
European and Inter-American systems.3? 
The Commission began by meeting for 10 days twice a year. Valuable 
time was spent trying to reach consensus for its decisions and, as a con-
sequence, insufficient time was spent achieving the Commission's desig-
nated objectives,38 and the Commission appeared inactive. This further 
fueled the criticism. Another obstacle was the lack of legal officers be-
sides the secretary of the Commission. Besides undertaking other re-
sponsibilities, the Commissioners originally had to draft the decisions in 
committees. Currently, there are legal officers in the Commission and it 
has been possible to improve on the format of the deci-
sions/recommendations, which now include a statement of the facts, ap-
plicable laws and the reasons for the decisions. 
Having overcome the problem of locus standi for non-state entities, the 
Commission was faced by other hurdles in Article 56 of the Charter. For 
instance, it was to accept only communications that "[a]re not written in 
disparaging or insulting language directed against the state concerned 
and its institutions or to the Organization of Mrican Unity; [and] [a]re 
not based exclusively on news disseminated through the media .... "39 
The Commission virtually ignored the civility test for complaints be-
cause many authors of communications were usually disgruntled persons 
or organizations who resented the violation of human rights. The alleged 
violations were usually expressed in strong terms that could fail the lan-
guage test, if applied strictly. An inadmissible complaint could be turned 
down if the language was also foul. Once the Commission overcame the 
initial delays caused by the different approaches, it paid little regard to 
that test. 
The prohibition of action based solely on the media was a real obstacle 
for a while because of the difficult issues that arose, i.e., must the Com-
mission wait for a communication from a state, an NGO, or an individual 
before it intervened? Could the Commission initiate action proprio motu 
based on its own assessment of a situation based on the written or visual 
media? The media sometimes gave out information about serious viola-
tions of human rights, followed by condemnations by foreign govern-
ments and international NGOs. The absence of statements from the Af-
rican Commission gave the impression that the Commission was either 
37. African Charter, supra note 2, at arts. 60, 61. 
38. See generally id. 
39. Id. at art. 58(3)-(4). 
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unaware or uncaring. The real explanation was that a prolonged argu-
ment had taken place within the Commission on a line of appropriate 
action. While some Commissioners gave the relevant provisions a pur-
posive or teleological interpretation to enable it to act, others insisted on 
a restrictive interpretation that required a communication from outside. 
The Liberian situation in 1969 provided the opportunity for a way for-
ward. The media was full of gory stories of human rights violations, but 
there was no complaint from any source, and the Commissioners dis-
agreed sharply on whether to act or wait for a communication from the 
State to intervene. Mter protracted deliberations, it was agreed to send a 
letter to the Government asking for information on the situation and of-
fering the services of the Chairman to help restore normalcy. 
Predictably, there was no response, but that precedent facilitated inquir-
ies about subsequent situations of serious or massive violations of human 
rights. The Commission relied exclusively on evidence gathered from 
the media and condemned the violations. Similarly, the execution of 
military officers in Nigeria and in Sudan and the killing of university 
students in Lumumbashi, Zaire, in the early 1990s, were condemned on 
the basis of information obtained from the media. The development was 
good for the image of the Commission, for the public saw it as being 
alive to human rights violations in Africa and doing something about 
them. The Commission called the attention of the chairman of the OAU 
to them, but nothing came out of such reference and there were no spe-
cific complaints about them at the time. 
Unlike the European (since abolished) and Inter-American Commissions 
of Human Rights, the African Commission has both protective and pro-
motional responsibilities. Its main protective responsibility is to receive 
communications on violations of human rights protected by the Charter, 
communicate them to the states and investigate with a view to reconcil-
ing the parties.40 The Commission may take oral or written evidence.41 It 
then communicates its decisions, which are really recommendations, to 
the parties, and includes them in its activity report except in emergency 
situations, when it communicates to the Chairman.42 The Commission 
does not pursue its decisions to ensure that they are carried out but occa-
sionally grants interim measures to avoid irredeemable harm.43 
40. [d. at Ch.3. 
41. [d. at art. 51. 
42. [d. at art. 58. 
43. Constitutional Rights Project v. Niger. African Comm'n on H. & Peoples' R., Commc'n 
87\93, 8th Activity Report 1994-5, Annex VI, DOCUMENTS OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON 
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The promotional responsibilities of the African Commission include the 
holding of conferences, seminars and symposia on human and peoples' 
rights, either alone or in collaboration with other organizations. The 
Commission may formulate principles on which African states may leg-
islate on human and peoples' rights.44 For the purpose of promoting hu-
man rights, it divided African states among the eleven Commissioners, 
which they carry out in the inter-session periods and within available 
resources. The Commissioners work part-time, and only full-time when 
in session, and only recently were the sessions increased to periods of 14 
days. 
Since the Commission was not sufficiently funded by its parent organiza-
tion, some of the Commissioners wanted funds raised from outside the 
OAU for promotional activities. They considered that the Commission 
would thus be enabled to function. Some AU members defaulted in their 
dues to the organization, while a few required external support for their 
own internal administration. It would be natural therefore to seek exter-
nal support for the work of the Commission. Others opposed it vehe-
mently, fearing it might compromise its independence and lead to accu-
sations of corruption. The issue produced the usual controversy between 
those who were anxious to see the Commission actively involved in its 
work and thus fulfill the high hopes placed on it, and others who were 
conservative and inclined to give a restrictive interpretation to the char-
ter. A compromise was achieved by referring the matter to the Secretariat 
for advice which was favourable but with the caveat that the integrity of 
the Commission must not be compromised. Financial support for the 
Commission's promotional activities has come from such foreign institu-
tions as the Danish Agency for International Development (DANIDA), 
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and Raoul Wallen-
berg Institute for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Lund, Sweden. 
Support for conferences also came from the European Union and the UN 
Commission for Human Rights (now the UN Council for Human 
Rights).45 
III. TOW ARDS GREATER EFFECTIVENESS 
Having considered the major problems of the Commission especially at 
its early stages, we can now proffer some remedies. 
HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS, 391. The 8th Activity report is also available at 
http://wwwI.umn.edulhumanrtslafricalACHPRI.htm. 
44. African Charter, supra note 2, at art. 45(1)(b). 
45. See African Comm'n on H. & People's R., Final Communique of the 10th Ordinary Ses-
sion (1991), available at http://www.achpr.orglenglishlcommuniqueslcommuniquelO_en.html (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2007). 
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(a) The division of 52 African states among 11 Commissioners 
results in each of them having, in some cases, as many as four 
states, to promote human rights. Since they work part-time, they 
are unable to work effectively. The European Commission had a 
member from each member-state and the Inter-American Com-
mission has seven members and promotion is not included in 
their functions. The size of the African continent and the large 
number of states require a larger number of commissioners. We 
suggest that the number should be doubled. 
(b) The funding for the Commission should be increased for ef-
fective promotion of human rights throughout the continent. If it 
has not already done so, the Mrican Commission should open a 
desk for the fundraising outside the AU. The expected sources 
should be states, international institutions and private sources 
that are disposed to funding human rights. 
(c) The qualifications for Commissioners are stated to be: "Mri-
can personalities of the highest reputation, known for their high 
morality, integrity, impartiality and competence in matters of 
human and peoples' rights; particular consideration being given 
to persons having legal experience."46 Although Commissioners 
are not strictly required to be lawyers, those selected so far have 
been lawyers. The interpretation of legal documents requires the 
expertise of lawyers. Although human rights have become inter-
disciplinary, the job of Commissioners requires lawyers and es-
pecially those who have done further work in human rights. 
They must also have the moral courage to make pronouncements 
against erring governments, whether their own or foreign. 
A Commissioner should therefore be more than just a lawyer; he should, 
in the words of the Charter, be "competent in matters of human and peo-
pIes' rights. "47 
(d) Although he was nominated by a state and elected by states, 
the essence of serving in his personal capacity emphasizes a de-
tachment from governments, so as to better protect the rights 
guaranteed. A number of Commissioners have held positions 
such as ambassadors, attorneys-general and judges. Others were 
academics and legal practitioners. Civil and political office 
holders tend to be unduly protective of governments. An ambas-
46. African Ciwner, supra note 2, at art. 31 (I). 
47. [d. 
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sador is trained to defend his state without appearing to be doing 
so. Judges are known to stick strictly to the limits of the law. In 
the International Law of Human Rights, both the lex lata (the 
law as it is) and the lex ferenda (the law as it ought to be) are 
very important, and often close. Economic and social rights, 
which were formerly ignored, are now acknowledged, and the 
right to a healthy environment is now taken seriously. The law 
is constantly changing to catch up with changing circumstances. 
This requires flexibility and the determination to protect human 
dignity on the part of the Commissioners. The Second Work-
shop on NGO Participation in the Work of the African Commis-
sion, held in 1992, recommended that the holding of official po-
sitions, such as ambassador and minister be found incompatible 
with the office of a Commissioner. We endorse the idea because 
it enhances the independence of the Commission, and makes it 
transparent. 
(e) Presently, the Commissioners, including the chairman, work 
part-time. The continuous work of the Commission rests on the 
officials, whose number has increased slightly. On the other 
hand, the president of the African Court on Human and Peoples' 
Rights works full-time and lives at the seat of the court, while 
the other judges live wherever it is convenient. This arrange-
ment should be extended to the Commission. The President's 
and Vice-President's availability will improve and expedite the 
work of the Commission. 
(f) The Commission should do more to advertise its work and 
disseminate its publications. There should be more cooperation 
with the media, NGOs and institutions of higher learning. Pub-
licity is a potent weapon in the field of human rights, as without 
it, it is impossible to achieve the full effect from efforts ex-
pended. Many of its decisions are not known in the states from 
which the complaints originate beyond those who are directly af-




The envisaged role of the founding fathers of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights is that the Commission should conciliate and 
intercede in human rights disputes and effect amicable settlement. A 
court of law decides on the basis of law that may result in total victory 
for one party and total defeat for the other. Whether the parties remain 
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friendly thereafter is not the business of the court. That was the reasoning 
behind the non-inclusion of the court in the charter originally. African 
dispute resolution stresses future good relations. Thus a debtor may be 
forgiven his debt if he cannot pay and if the creditor can afford to forego 
the amount. A great majority of rural dwellers operate in this way, what-
ever the influence of imported systems in the urban areas. 
The Statute of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights has 
taken effect with the fifteenth ratification, but only one state, Burkina 
Paso, allows applications from non-state entities. Only the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo brought a complaint against other states (Uganda, 
Rwanda and Burundi) for invading its territory following which their 
troops committed gross violations of human rights.48 Just as with the 
Commission, African states are not likely to be enthusiastic litigants 
against other states before the African Court. It follows that the dockets 
of the Court are not likely to be filled with cases, a rather bleak prospect 
for the court itself. It is not likely to have the opportunity of expounding 
Jurisprudence to the same extent as the European Court or even the Inter-
American Court. It follows that the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights will continue to be relevant on human rights at the inter-
African level; if only it is properly empowered and funded, and if only 
the Commissioners cultivate a proactive frame of mind. 
48. Dem. Rep. Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda & Uganda, supra note 27. 
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